Furor Divinus : creativity in Plato's Ion by Benjamin, Andrew

Scientific Board: 
Prof. Leonardo Amoroso (Università di Pisa), Prof. Christian Benne (University of 
Copenhagen), Prof. Andrew Benjamin (Monash University, Melbourne), Prof. Fabio 
Camilletti (Warwick University), Prof. Luca Crescenzi (Università di Pisa), Prof. Paul 
Crowther (NUI Galway), Prof. William Marx (Université Paris Ouest Nanterre), Prof. 
Alexander Nehamas (Princeton University), Prof. Antonio Prete (Università di Siena), 
Prof. David Roochnik (Boston University), Prof. Antonietta Sanna (Università di Pisa), 
Prof. Claus Zittel (Stuttgart Universität)
Executive Board
Matteo Bensi, Danilo Manca (coordinator), Lorenzo Serini, Valentina Serio, Marta Vero
Review Board:
Alessandra Aloisi, Ester Fuoco, Annamaria Lossi, Nikos Loukidelis, Cathrin Nielsen, 
Francesco Rossi
ODRADEK. Studies in Philosophy of Literature, Aesthetics and New Media Theories. 
ISSN 2465-1060 [online] 
Edited by Associazione “Zetesis-Progetto di studi e Dialoghi Filosofici”,
via Paoli, 15 - 56126 Pisa. Registered by Agenzia delle Entrate di Pisa, n. 3705, serie III, 
23.10.2014 
License Creative Commons
Odradek. Studies in Philosophy of Literature, Aesthetics and New Media Theories 
di Zetesis is licensed under a Creative Commons attribution, non-commercial 4.0 
International.
Further authorization out of this license terms may be available at http://zetesisproject.
com or writing to: zetesis@unipi.it.
Layout editor: Stella Ammaturo
Volume Editors: Alessandra Aloisi, Danilo Manca


Furor Divinus: Creativity in Plato’s Ion
Andrew Benjamin
Abstract
The aim of  this paper is to use the way creativity is 
understood within the argumentation of  Plato’s Ion to 
open up the possibility that Plato allows for a conception 
of  a produced object - work of  art - that can be judged 
even though its production is not regulated in advance by 
the ‘idea’  or the ‘paradigm’. Central to the development 
of  this position is Ficino’s commentary on the Ion.
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Restat ut in spiratione divina.
Marsilio Ficino
1.
Plato’s Ion ends with Socrates offering the 
following description of  Ion the rhapsode1. ‘As a 
eulogist of  Homer you are not skilled but divine’ 
(qe‹on enai kai m¾ tecnikÕn perˆ `Om»rou 
painšthn)2. While Socrates’ closing remarks might 
be construed as having a slightly certain mocking 
tone, it is the distinction between the divine and the 
technical that is of  far greater significance.
The question that guides the following 
engagement with Plato’s Ion pertains to the nature of  
the concession that Socrates may have been making. 
And again it should be noted that the distinction 
between the divine and the technical is made in 
relation to Homer. Ion, the rhapsode, has already 
been described as ‘possessed’ or occupied by the poet. 
There are at least two elements of  this formulation 
that are of  interest. The first is that implicit within 
1 This paper is an edited version of  a chapter of  a book in progress entitled 
Seeing Reading. Othering Hermeneutics. Additional elements of  this project 
that have been published thus far include, Benjamin (2014) and Benjamin 
(forthcoming).
2 Plato (1996), p. 542 B3. Translations that have been consulted are Saunders 
(2005) and Fowler (1925).
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the lines cited above, and indeed implicit within the 
concerns of  the dialogue as a whole, is, on the one 
hand, a distinction between creativity and the way 
it generates forms of  understanding and judgment, 
and then, on the other, the conception of  judgement 
that is defined almost uniquely in relation to techné3.
Once this distinction is allowed, and this will be a 
crucial point that has to be explored, what is opened 
up is the possibility of  a conception of  judgment 
that is no longer delimited by the technical4. While 
Socrates’ questioning in relation to the technical 
concerns evaluation, were there to be an account of  
the production of  work other than the one delimited 
by an insistence on the technical, then the question 
of  judgment would have to be rethought and thus 
reposed precisely because the primacy of  the model 
would no longer hold5. The separation of  one from 
the other would yield an opening.
3 For the history of  the distinction – or lack of  it - in Greek thought prior to 
Plato see Murray (1981). See in particular the discussion of  Democritus DK 
21.
4 While the argument leads in a different direction Silke-Maria Weineck also 
finds an implicit theory of  criticism (judgment) in the argumentation of  the 
Ion. See Weineck (1998). For another discussion of  the difficulties of  securing 
a definition of  inspiration or enthusiasm that holds it apart from madness see, 
Farness (1985), 167-8. It should also be noted that there would be an important 
link between enthusiasm, genius and melancholia. As that history unfolds the 
link to Plato and Ficino becomes more complex. See in the regard, Daval 
(2009).
5 Liebert (2013). Liebert draws a similar conclusion concerning the production 
of  ‘fiction’ that is «distinct from – and potentially at odds with – the Platonic 
conception of  mimesis», p. 213. The argument developed here is that this 
distancing does not of  necessity involve the concept of  fiction.
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The model or more strictly the ‘paradigm’ 
(par£deigma) is a fundamental motif  in Plato’s 
thought. Even though its relation to the theory of  
ideas or forms is an area of  contestation, at its most 
straightforward the paradigm or model functions 
within a causal relation to the identity of  a particular. 
Note, for example, its role in the Timaeus 28A:
But when the artificer (Ð dhmiourgÕj) of  any 
object, in forming its shape and quality, keeps 
his gaze fixed on that which is uniform, using 
a model of  this kind (parade…gmati), that 
object, executed in this way, must of  necessity 
be beautiful6.
Creation here is linked to the presence of  a 
paradigm and more crucially it is the paradigm that 
establishes the quality of  the particular. Here the 
object is ‘beautiful’ as a result.
While the terminology of  the ‘paradigm’ is not 
present in the Phaedo it can be suggested that there 
is a similar structure of  argumentation. This can be 
located in the following claim made by Socrates in 
regards to the identity of  a particular as beautiful. 
I think that if  anything is beautiful besides 
absolute beauty (aÙtÕ tÕ kalÒn) it is beautiful 
for no other reason than because it partakes 
(metšcei) of  absolute beauty7 (100C).
6 References to the Timaeus are to the Loeb Edition.
7 References to the Phaedo are to the Loeb Edition. See Plato (1914).
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The process of  the particular partaking in 
‘absolute beauty’ (aÙtÕ tÕ kalÒn) is the identification 
of  a causal relation in which the identity of  the 
particular – here the particular’s identity as beautiful – 
is dependent on the relation to a mode of  externality. 
While in the Republic both forms of  argumentation 
are present, the retention of  the exact language of  the 
paradigm or pattern can be identified in a discussion 
of  the possibility of  ideal as opposed to actual cites. 
Within that engagement the presence of  the ideal is 
formulated in terms of  a pattern.
There is a paradigm (p£deigma) of  it laid up 
in heaven for him who wishes to see it and so 
beholding to constitute himself  its citizen8.
It will be essential to return to the paradigm 
or model as that which in setting a limit, thus in 
constructing a threshold, allows for a form of  
transformation to be staged. To displace the primacy 
of  one account of  the generation of  particulars 
would necessitate the move to the other conception 
of  creativity at work in the dialogue. There would 
be the move from one form of  judgment to another.
That transformation, which is being worked here, 
can be conceived in terms of  the othering of  judgment. 
This is a process that will open up the hermeneutic. 
Othering is a form of  retained displacement. It occurs, 
as has been intimated, as a result of  repositioning 
8 Plato (2013), p. 592A-B.
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questions of  interpretation and judgment beyond the 
domain delimited by the model9. The retention of  the 
model retains a sense of  judgment that would obviate 
the necessity of  deliberation.
It would judgment as confirmation rather than 
judgment as a participatory process. What has 
been described as the othering of  judgment would 
be the move from the singularity of  confirmation 
to complex modes of  judgment and relationality 
demanded by the participatory.
The possibility of  this transformative potential is 
the opening to the second element that is inherent in 
the distinction between the divine and the technical. 
What occurs in that relation, and in the movement 
towards judgement, is what can be described as the 
suspended question of  creativity.
In Ficino’s reformulation of  this position in his 
Introduction to Plato’s Ion he describes the possession 
of  Ion thus; ‘occupation means the seizing of  the soul 
and its conversion (conversionem) to the spirits of  the 
Muses’10. (A position that is reiterated by Plato in 
the Phaedrus at 245A). Moreover, Ficino notes the 
connection that can be drawn between ‘inspiration’ 
9 While the argumentation is different there a sense in which Jean-Luc Nancy 
is also concerned with another conception of  the hermeneutic. In his study of  
the Ion he argues as part of  his conclusion that, «L’hermeia est l’announce de 
l’autre à l’autre, et elle l’est dans la measure où  l’autre ne peut etre signifié, ni 
présentée, mais seulement annoncé. L’annonce est aussi le mode de la presence 
proper à l’autre. Ainsi l’hermenia est l’annonce de la finitude à la finitude : sa 
partition est infinite». See Nancy (1982), p. 88.
10 This text can be found in Ficino (2008).
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and ‘intoxication’ at 534A in the Ion, if  only then to 
go on and note that the latter is to be distinguished 
from divino furor which is defined on the text as the 
‘illumination of  the rational soul’. The importance 
of  poetry, and as noted, its link to furor divinus, is 
clear from both his Introduction to Plato’s Ion and 
the De Amore. Within Ficino’s project Platonism is 
bound up with the process of  the soul’s elevation11.
Given that setting, what Ficino underscores is 
the possibility that the concerns of  the dialogue are 
orientated far more towards the question of  creation 
than they are the limiting of  poetry by delimiting it in 
relation to other skills12. Indeed, Ficino’s conclusion 
that Ion in regards to Homer ‘does not judge by art’ 
(non arte iudicat) allows for the possibility that not only 
is there a theory of  creation there is also a conception 
of  judgement that is not defined by a relation to 
11 Ficino (2012), p. 13-14.
12 For a detailed engagement both with the question of  the possibility of  a techné 
of  poetry and the extent to which there is a defence of  poetry in the Ion see 
Stern-Gillet (2004). Stern-Gillet is keen to argue that the Ion is «no eulogy 
of  poetry». The project here is to see that there is a defense of  poetry that is 
neither the one advanced by Shelley nor a mere incorporation of  Romanticism. 
And yet, it depends upon reading Kant on genius as theory of  non-mimetic 
production (where of  course mimesis is understood strictly in Platonic terms.) 
What is identified therefore is a tension at the heart of  Plato concerning the 
question of  creation. Moreover there is an important affinity of  project here 
with the way that Ernst Cassirer approaches Plato. He engages with the latter 
in terms of  the attempt to account for why given the apparent condemnation 
of  art and the practice of  mimesis within Plato’s writings was there constant 
recourse to those writings, from Ficino onwards, in order to think the 
particularity of  art. Cassirer undertakes this work in his Eidos und Eidolon. See 
Cassirer (2004). For another interpretation of  the Ion that seeks to distance 
the dialogue from Plato’s expulsion of  the poets and which is also concerned 
with the relation between Socrates and Homer see Freydberg (2000), p. 100-
102.
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a model13. This is not just Ficino’s insight. It is a 
possibility that is there at the heart of  the dialogue 
itself. To deploy a formulation of  Kant’s what comes 
into play as a result is a conception of  creation, 
one named by Kant as ‘genius’ and which, in Kant’s 
terms «everyone agrees[...] is entirely opposed to 
the spirit of  imitation (Nachahamungsgeiste)»14. Of  
significance here is how the ‘spirit of  imitation’ 
(Nachahamungsgeiste) is being understood and thus 
what an opposition to this ‘spirit’ would entail. Hence, 
the connection is not between Ficino and Kant as 
though there were a simple overlap of  concerns.
On the contrary, what is of  interest, and thus 
what will emerge in the argumentation to come, is 
the way that in both Kant and Ficino (and note that 
this is Ficino’s interpretation of  the Ion, and thus 
the uncovering of  what he takes to be central to the 
dialogue) there is another conception of  what will 
come to be termed a singularity and thus a radically 
different conception of  the relationship between the 
singular and the model (universal) that is taken to 
figure both within Platonism more generally and in 
the Ion in particular. 
13 For an extensive discussion of  the nature of  the paradigm and its relation to 
Plato’s more commented upon language of  forms and ideas see, Perl (1999).
14 This is the position advanced by Kant in Critique of  the Power of  Judgment. 
See Kant (2009). Central to the overall argument are the two claims that Kant 
makes.  Firstly, at the beginning of  §47 that: «Everyone agrees that genius 
is entirely opposed to the spirit of  imitation.’ A position that builds on the 
earlier (§46) definition of  ‘genius’ as ‘a talent for producing that for which no 




While the connection between techné and 
interpretation has one outcome, what continues to 
endure is the possibility of  a conception or theory of  
understanding, and its concomitant link to judgment, 
that is situated outside an already determined, 
and determining, relation to the model. Occurring 
beyond that hold is that which is, to cite Kant 
again, «entirely opposed to the spirit of  imitation 
(Nachahamungsgeiste)».
Part of  the argument to be advanced is that 
the move from the dominance of  the model to 
its overcoming – which, as has been suggested, 
is a conception of  othering that will open up the 
hermeneutic – and within which interpretation moves 
from immediacy to mediacy, the interpretive process, 
the hermeneutic as such, comes to adopt what will 
be called the temporality of  reading. Following this 
path makes the question of  whether or not poetry is 
a techné far less relevant.
The question of  judgment, where judgement 
while present as a generality can for the most part 
be equated with confirmation, occurs at a number 
of  precise points within the dialogue. As a way 
in, one particular use of  the term will open up 
the issues that have overall centrality. If  it can be 
assumed that the dialogue circulates not just around 
the interpretation of  Homer but more significantly 
around, firstly, what is involved within such acts, and 
then secondly, what makes them possible and then 
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finally the status of  the interpretive object within 
them, it should be clear as a result that the manner 
in which Socrates positions Homer is a decisive part 
of  the argumentation.
Socrates cites several passages from Homer. 
Having quoted them he is then concerned with 
the question of  who is their proper addressee and 
therefore who is best to judge them. For example, 
Socrates cites – or rather claims to be so doing – 
Iliad XI. 639-40. The lines are taken by Socrates to 
refer to the curative effects of  Parmneian wine.
The questions that are then posed to Ion concern 
the one who is best positioned to judge as to whether 
this particular wine does indeed have such effects. 
Ion is quick to respond that any answer has to be 
the province of  the doctor not the rhapsode. A mode 
of  questioning and answering that is connected to 
a specific sense of  both knowledge and propriety 
then continues. Each time a specific content can be 
identified with a particular skill or techné,
Ion is being positioned to argue that the one 
having the skill in question is best able to judge. 
Indeed, Socrates’ method within the dialogue involves 
him dividing up the texts of  Homer in order to locate 
in specific passages, in the lines that are cited, a set 
of  different but nonetheless clearly identifiable skills. 
Socrates has of  course laid a trap into which Ion will 
inevitably stumble. Given this frame of  reference it 
cannot be true that the rhapsode has all these skills. 
17 
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This has to be the case since what is central in any 
one act of  judgement is the possession of  the skill 
appropriate to the skill presented within the passage 
of  the Homeric text under consideration. This is the 
skill the judgment of  which is to take place. That 
it is any one specific skill is clear from that which 
attends the lines being cited. There needs to be an 
accord therefore on the level of  techné. 
There are passages within the Homeric texts 
whose content is such that only a seer or a general 
would be able to judge since, given the content of  the 
passage, only they would possess the requisite techné 
to make a judgment. Moreover, it would be a techné 
that had been learnt. Skills are acquired. And yet, 
when Socrates asks Ion what should the rhapsode 
be able «to see and analyses better than all other 
people» (skope‹sqai kaˆ diakr…nein par¦ toÝj 
¥llouj ¢nqrèpouj) Ion’s answer is emphatic. The 
object of  the rhapsode’s judgment is ‘everything’ 
(¤panta). At that point Socrates has trapped Ion.
It cannot be the case that if, for example, the 
doctor is the only one competent to make judgments 
in relation to passages that pertain uniquely to the 
techné of  medicine, that the rhapsode would then be 
able to make a similar judgment. The doctor is the 
only one to have the requisite skill.
Whatever the competencies the rhapsode may 
have they do not include skills for which training 
18 
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has not been provided. The question is how then to 
understand Ion’s claim that ‘everything’ (¤panta) 
can be judged by the rhapsode. Delimitations are 
precise. In every instance Socrates’ arguments 
conclude with the same exacting concision. 
I take it that what we come to know by the art 
of  piloting we cannot also come to know by that 
of  medicine (537C). 
At stake here is a form of  knowledge 
(gignèskw). The project of  knowledge, even as a 
generality, is linked to techné. There cannot be one 
without the other.
Moreover, the interplay between ‘knowledge’ 
and techné reinforces the equation of  judgment with 
confirmation. Given the division with the realm 
of  techné and thus both the limited and delimited 
nature of  the object of  any one skill, the question 
noted above endures: i.e. what, when Ion use the 
word, does ‘everything’ (¤panta) mean? Leaving 
aside any possible foolishness on Ion’s part a specific 
claim is being made.
Whether as the result of  inadvertence or 
advertence the answer provided by Ion gestures to 
the distancing of  the epistemological in the name of  
the hermeneutic and as a result the model ceding its 
place to another sense of  judgment. This opening is 
the other possibility within the dialogue. The guiding 
question is clear: what does it means for something 
19 
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to be an object of  judgment – thus judgeable – when 
it is not the result of  the techné? Not only is this one 
possible outcome to which Ficino has already been 
taken to be alluding, it is also the case that its force 
resides in its possibility as a question. 
2.
If  there is a beginning then it concerns the 
identification of  Homer as «the best and divinest 
of  poets» (tù ¢r…stJ kaˆ qeiot£tJ tJn poihtJn) 
530B. This occurs as the dialogue starts. Homer’s 
divinity is announced by Socrates in his first major 
speech. Here, what matters is not just the quality 
of  Homer’s poetry but his ‘divinity’; the former is 
accounted for by the latter. Techné is already being 
distanced.
And yet quality – Homer is the ‘best’ – is being 
retained. Hence judgment endures. While the 
formulation in which Homer is presented as ‘divine’ 
can be taken as attesting to the beginnings of  a 
tradition in which he figures as the ‘divine Homer’, 
a tradition with its own important continuity within 
Neo-Platonism and the latter’s resurgence in the 
Renaissance, the contention here is that it is also 
productively read in relation to the description of  
20 
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the role of  the Muse at 533E15. 
The passage that is central is the following:
In the same way the muse inspires (¹ Moàsa 
™nqšouj) and then by the means of  those inspired 
(tîn ™nqšwn) the inspiration (™nqousiazÒtwn) 
spreads to others and connects them all in a chain.
The passage continues with the related claim 
that all good poets recite poetry not as the result 
of  skill ‘but because they are used and possessed’ 
(¢ll’œnqeoi Ôntej kai katecÒmenoi). If  the link 
is between these different forms of  the ‘divine’ 
– as substance and as a mode of  presence – 
then there is a further connection to the other 
significant distinction that Socrates establishes at 
the beginning of  the dialogue. He argues in that 
context that the good rhapsode is concerned not 
with mere ‘words’ (œph), the lines of  verse, but with 
the poet’s ‘thought’ (di£noia).
The consequence of  this designation is it 
delimits the propriety of  the rhapsode, namely, that 
the rhapsode is the one concerned with ‘thought’ 
rather than mere lines of  verse. Hence, distanced in 
advance is the supposition that the poem could ever 
have been identical to its presence in these lines.
The move from words to thought also generates 
the rhapsode’s related task. In regards to the latter 
Socrates is unequivocal. The task is clear: 
15 For a systematic investigation of  the ‘divine Homer’ see Lamberton (1989).
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the rhapsode has to be an interpreter of  the 
poet’s thought (˜rmhnša de‹ toà poihtoà tÁj 
diano…aj) to the audience (530C).
At this precise point the dialogue becomes 
more complex since another form of  relationality is 
positioned. The introduction of  the word ˜rmneÚj 
occurs in the context of  an evocation of  necessary 
movement and thus a form of  passage.
The evocation of  Hermes is clear. Within this 
setting however the movement is neither between 
Gods, nor Gods and mortals. Rather the movement 
in question is between the mind of  the poet and the 
audience. The rhapsode is the mediating figure. The 
question to which it is important to be attentive 
concerns what it is that the rhapsode carries? The 
task of  the rhapsode is connected, from the start, 
with this movement, with a carrying over.
Recalled here with the question of  what the 
rhapsode carries is, of  course, the delimitation of  
what identifies the project of  the ‘good rhapsode’ 
(¢gaqÕj ∙ayJdÒj). What the latter has to covey 
is the ‘thought’ (di£noia). ‘Thought’ is therefore 
present in its irreducibility to lines of  verse. The 
force of  this distinction is clear. The distinction 
announces an opening in which both the subject and 
the object and thus their relation are transformed.
More specifically, it stages and thus this is what 
needs to be explained, a non-necessary relation 
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between ‘thought’ and expression, which here can 
be understood in terms of  a distinction between 
the presence of  ‘thought’ and the lines in which it 
is expressed. However, ‘thought’ is not in the lines 
of  the poem; ‘thought’ is not present within them in 
any simplistic way.
Presence is complicated in advance. Hence, if  
the lines were equated with form, then ‘thought’ 
does not stand apart from form, rather it is that 
which informs form. No matter how plastic form 
may be, form cannot function as an end in itself. (The 
evocation of  the merely plastic is therefore no more 
than a promulgation of  an empty formalism).
Opening up a concern with form as always 
already informed, formed within relations of  
indetermination, is both the predicament and the 
possibility of  the hermeneutic16. Irreducibility and 
mediation work together. They stand opposed to the 
immediacy of  the relations that are sanctioned by 
techné and which equates judgment with confirmation.
Moreover, if  seeing has a form of  immediacy 
then immediacy can be given neither explanatory 
nor temporal priority. Rather, immediacy needs to 
16 The relationship between allegory and allegoresis forms a fundamental 
element of  the larger project of  which this paper forms a part. The difficulty 
inherent in allegory is that while the allegorical resists the literal there is a 
tendency to attribute a singular meaning to the allegory. It is as though an 
allegory has a literal meaning. What the term allegoresis signals is the potential 
within any allegory for it to continue to be allegorized and thus to resist its 
reduction to a singular literal attribution of  meaning. Clearly this argument 
bears an important relation to the way the distinction between the immediate 
and the mediate is understood in the context of  this paper.
23 
Andrew Benjamin
be understood as im-mediacy, namely as a produced 
state. While this begins to give an account of  the 
object, what occurs at the same time is the need to 
take up as a domain of  inquiry the temporality of  
mediacy. Recalled within such a setting is what can 
be described, again, as the temporality of  reading.
Reading opposes seeing. Or, rather, reading 
incorporates seeing within processes of  mediation. 
Moreover, once mediacy obtains then judgment 
cannot be separated from contestability. Reading as 
a form of  mediation incorporates both deliberation 
and the structure of  the self/other relation that is 
necessitated by that incorporation. 
Once the dialogue is taken as whole it should 
be clear from the outset that the hermeneutic 
is the process of  mediation that is sustained by 
the rhapsode and which brings a structure of  
deliberation into play. To follow the suggestion 
noted above, deliberation however can be recast in 
this context in terms of  reading.
There is a further consideration that needs to be 
introduced at this point. If  the hermeneutic has its 
own object, then it is not given by an identification 
of  a set of  lines with their immediate content. (As 
though there were ever just immediate content, as 
opposed, of  course to im-mediate content).
On the contrary, allowing for the hermeneutic in 
the way the term has been developed thus far means 
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that indetermination precedes determination. What 
has to be located is an opening in which immediacy 
yields to mediacy.
As a consequence the always already 
indeterminate, what can be provisionally identified 
as the to-be-determined, as both an ontological and 
semantic consideration, can be attributed primacy. 
All of  these terms – e.g. indetermination, the 
hermeneutic, to-be-determined – do not close down 
the question of  judgment. On the contrary, they 
establish, firstly, the terms in which judgment has 
another possibility, such that, secondly, what counts 
as the judgeable then has a different quality. In both 
instances the judgeable located in its separation from 
the effective presence of  either a paradigm or a techné.
Another set of  connections is established; 
pursuing them necessitates a return to the way what 
has already been identified as the ‘divine’ figures. The 
presence of  the divine is given in relation to another 
possibility for judgment. Socrates is clear that Ion’s 
ability to praise Homer is not located in a techné but 
from a divine dispensation. 
His language is unequivocal - oÙ tšcnV ¦ll¦ 
qe…v mo…rv 536D. What needs to be recalled of  
course is the description of  Homer as divine. The 
question, as has been intimated, is what does divine 




Such a return becomes possible once the affinity 
between the language used to describe Homer and 
the language of  inspiration itself  is noted17. There 
are two related positions insofar as that which is 
inspired (œnqeoj) and to be inspired (™nqe£zw) are 
both explicable in terms of  being charged with the 
presence of  the divine.
In order to understand what such an explication 
entails it is essential to look in more detail at how 
techné is understood, since techné stands opposed to 
the divine in terms of  the subject/object relation 
it engenders and thus, as has been suggested, the 
conceptions of  both subject and object that are 
themselves related within the structure of  the 
hermeneutic.
Each techné, cannot be separated from a specific 
practice and which in turn is connected to a specific 
form of  knowledge. As the techné changes so does 
its object. In the context of  the Ion the position is 
announced clearly:
by the same skill (tšcnV) we must know the 
same things, and by a different skill things that 
17 For a general discussion of  this topic in ancient thought see Murray (2015).
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are not the same; but if  the skill is other, the 
things we know by it must be different also 
(538A).
Without here entering into the question of  what 
defines the essential nature of  a specific domain of  
knowledge, it remains the case that what is significant 
is that any one instance of  a practice – e.g. general, 
seer, doctor – is recognized as such insofar as it is a 
particular instance of  the general. In other words, it 
is recognized as such in relation to an organizational 
model. (To which it should be added that what this 
also entails is that each techné could not itself  be a 
locus of  disputation concerning its nature).
While this position can be ascribed a form of  
generality such that as a position it draws together 
ostensibly metaphysical concerns, which here means 
the relationship between the universal (equally 
the model or paradigm) and particulars, with 
epistemological ones, where the latter are defined by 
the knowledge of  the identity of  a given particular, 
what is at work within such a setup, while still 
involving these concerns, is importantly different.
In the case of  the exchanges between Ion and 
Socrates the object around which their discussion 
turns is not poetry qua poetry but rather the poetic 
text, more specifically texts by Homer. Whether it is 
recognized or not what is under discussion is a complex 
relationship between reading and performing. Ion 
reads texts. Read texts are performed.
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The lines he cites were initially read. Socrates 
counters with the citations of  texts – perhaps cited 
from memory and thus in part misremembered – that 
were themselves also initially read. Given that what 
is involved is reading, the performing of  the read, 
the question to be addressed concerns the nature of  
the link between techné and reading.
The importance of  that specific question hinges, 
of  course, on the possibility that it is only in the move 
from the model/particular relation and thus towards 
the hermeneutic that the centrality of  reading can 
emerge18. Reading names as much an occurrence, 
an act that occurs in silentio, as it does a subject/
object relation. Reading announces a relation to its 
literal presence at the same time as it allows for the 
impossibility of  that reduction.
As the interchange between Socrates and Ion 
unfolds Homer continues to be cited. Homer is read. 
Ion cites, by memory, a passage whose ostensible 
concern is horse racing. At stake within the passage, 
as a beginning, is the care that needs to be shown at 
the ‘turning post’. Ion cites at Socrates prompting:
Bend thyself  in the polished car slightly to 
the left of  them; and call to the right-hand horse 
and goad him on, while your hand slackens his 
reins. And at the post let your left-hand horse 
18 While the detail cannot be pursued here for an investigation of  the status of  
reading in Ancient Greece see, Knox (1968) and Svenbro (1992).
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swerve close, so that the nave of  the well-
wrought wheel may seem to come up to the edge 
of  the stone, which yet avoid to touch (537A-B).
Socrates stops Ion reciting. It is as though he has 
said enough. What Socrates wants explained, and 
for Socrates it is the question the passage generates, 
is who is in a position to know what is being said 
«in these lines». To be more precise the question 
pertains to the one best placed to know if  Homer 
‘speaks correctly’ (Ñrqîj lšgei).
The ‘words’ (œph) themselves are the locus of  
correctness. The supposition therefore has to be 
that the lines are explicable, perhaps only really 
explicable, on the level of  techné. An explication 
that would always have to take place such that the 
indetermination of  reading did not occur.
Both Ion and Socrates agree that the charioteer 
is best placed to know the answer to the question 
of  correctness. The reason is straightforward. 
The charioteer has the appropriate techné. It is not 
difficult to identify the structure of  interpretation 
that is at work here. The content of  words can only 
be identified as having been used correctly if  the act 
of  identification deploys the techné appropriate to the 
content of  the techné stated by the words.
Were the words to misstate that which is proper 
to a given techné then the one possessing it would 
recognize that misstatement. In both the positive 
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and negative instances therefore what occurs has a 
twofold quality. In the first instance it is a relation 
on the level of  techné. While in the second there is an 
immediacy of  presentation insofar as the ‘correctness’ 
of  the words is given within them. Truth is always 
there in the content.
There is a clear pedagogical correlate here since 
the role of  education then becomes the teaching 
of  the skill in which that truth can be recovered19. 
Epistemology would always be given precedence. 
Deliberation would hinder a project whose truth 
would have to be there immediately. 
The pedagogical is important here as what it 
opens up is transmission as a problem. (Transmission 
as a subject/object relation and not as a historical 
passage). If  the lines can be equated with their 
content then the relationship between lines and 
knowledge is such that any set of  lines is identified 
with the knowledge that they are taken to be staging 
– e.g. Iliad XXIII, 335 passim is actually about the 
care needed to be shown in horse racing.
As a result knowledge claims within any given 
set of  lines would then always need to be explicable 
19 The argument in the Republic concerning myth is relevant here:
«“Don’t you understand,” I said, “that we begin by telling children fables, and the 
fable is, taken as a whole, false, but there is truth in it also?” (oÙ manq£neij, 
Ãn d’™gè, Óti prîton to‹j paid…oij mÚqouj)». Discerning the truth would be 
the moment at which the ostensibly epistemological took precedence over the 
hermeneutic. See Plato (2013), p. 377A. 
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in terms of  the object’s self-presentation. The 
presence of  the truth (or falsehood) will then be 
immediately clear to whomsoever is best placed 
to make that judgment. Within this structure 
judgments are contestable purely within the ambit 
of  the epistemological rather than a domain of  
deliberation. As has already been intimated judgment 
within the former setting confirms truth, while in 
the latter it demands the adducing of  argument and 
a certain constancy of  consideration20.
As a result a different temporal configuration 
would be involved. Deliberation takes place over time. 
Deliberation is placed. While time and place and with 
them the inscription of  a philosophical anthropology 
defined by being-in-place occur as a result, acquire 
centrality, it should not be thought that responding 
to the primacy of  the epistemological need take the 
form of  the refusal of  knowledge21.
Rather the argument has to be that the lines by 
Homer are not to be equated with their content (if  
content is delimited by the presence of  a certain 
techné, one techné as opposed to another). In other 
words, what Socrates demands is both a conception of  
knowledge and an understanding of  its presentation 
within words – here lines of  poetry – that will be 
complicated by the emergence of  allegory and thus 
20 On the complex question of  truth in Plato see Tsagdis (2015).
21 I have developed this aspect of  a philosophical anthropology in a number of  
contexts. See Benjamin (2016b), Benjamin (2015) and Benjamin (2010).
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an ensuing insistence on the allegorical status of  
texts. This is not to argue that Plato is unaware of  
the allegorical. On the contrary, the claim is that 
with the emergence of  the allegorical as a mode of  
textual interpretation there is a transformation in 
how the text is understood. 
While historically this can be traced in the 
move from Plato to Philo, within which what is 
transformed in the process is the presence of  Homer, 
what the recasting of  the text in terms of  allegory 
sanctions is the claim of  an original irreducibility22. 
(The general argument has to be that allegory 
cannot footstall processes of  allegoresis). What this 
entails is that even if  there is a knowledge claim, the 
text cannot be accounted for in terms of  that claim’s 
presence or, as significantly, the text equated with 
that which presents such claims. 
The identification of  the text, more accurately 
discrete passages cited in terms of  their capacity to 
stage a given techné, with a conception of  content 
that is explicable in terms of  techné is itself  the after-
effect of  an original irreducibility that attends the 
texts. Anoriginal irreducibility, i.e. an irreducibility 
that pertains at the original pertains here precisely 
because there is the insistent openness between 
thought and words23. The further point is that the 
22 The connection between Homer and Philo and the transformation of  the 
status of  the Homeric texts is demonstrated by Niehoff  (2014).
23 The formulation ‘anoriginal irreducibility’ is a central element of  the 
philosophical project of  which this paper forms a part. For a development of  
32 
Furor Divinus: Creativity in Plato’s ion
equation of  text with content, (an equation that 
literalizes content), is itself  the effacing of  the 
preconditions for the hermeneutic. That precondition, 
in attending the text, attending it to be read, is the 
text’s own irreducibility (a reduction of  itself  to 
itself). Identifying that always already attendant 
irreducibility, while a claim about the status of  the 
text, and thus about the ontological status of  the 
interpretive object, not only brings about significant 
changes in terms of  how the object is understood, it 
is a change that has a necessary correlate in regards 
to the status of  the subject. The transformation of  
the subject – a transformation occasioned by the 
nature of  the object is from a subject who sees to 
one who reads24. 
This is the point at which it is possible to respond 
to the question that emerged in relation to Ion’s use 
of  the term ‘everything’ (§panta). To recall the 
position: the object of  the rhapsode’s engagement, 
what the rhapsode understands best, is, according 
to Ion ‘everything’ (§panta). It should be clear 
that this is a position that can only emerge once the 
possibility of  judgment and thus of  an object being 
judgeable is not set by techné. As a result what Ion 
is allowing for is a conception of  judgment that is 
these term see, inter alia, Benjamin, (1993) and Benjamin (2015).
24 I have attempted to trace the move from seeing to reading in the context of  
Philo in Benjamin (2016a). 
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no longer delimited by a set of  specific relations. 
Once it is possible that lines of  text – in this context 
they are instances of  poetry - in which what would 
seem to be ostensibly the province of  the charioteer 
can be judged by one who is not a charioteer, then 
the immediate relation between lines and thought is 
broken. It must be remembered that what is at stake 
here is the response to lines of  poetry. If  Ion can be 
understood as saying that for a rhapsode ‘everything’ 
(§panta) can be judged, then the claim is that all 
lines of  poetry are judgeable, not in terms of  the 
presence of  a techné, but as lines of  poetry. This 
does not occur independently of  epistemological 
concerns, it is rather that epistemological concerns 
figure within an opening; an opening which is itself  
given by what has already been identified as the 
anoriginal irreducibility of  words and thought. 
While Ficino was concerned to ‘paint a portrait 
of  Plato as close as possible to the Christian truth’ 
what occurred at the same time was the recovery of  
the Plato that was more compatible with the project 
of  poetry and art25. The compatibility lay, firstly, in 
the presence of  the ‘divine’ and then, secondly, in the 
way the divine is linked to a conception of  creation 
that occurs without a model.
Terms such as œnqeoj and ™nqe£zw make it 
clear that the language of  inspiration cannot be 
25 Ficino (2001), p. 11.
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separated from the inhabitation of  the self  by the 
divine. While this opens clearly in the direction that 
Ficino will have wanted, what it also recognizes is 
that there is a conception of  creativity and thus a 
related conception of  judgment that resist imitation 
to the extent that the latter is understood in terms of  
either a paradigm or the conventional understanding 
of  the idea/form found in other dialogues by Plato.
Insisting on this point is to maintain what has 
already been referred to as opening up the suspended 
question of  creativity. This is of  course the link to 
Kant. Kant’s concern was to develop a conception of  
creativity that was not rule following and thus broke 
with the ‘spirit of  imitation’.
For Kant ‘nonsense’ (Unsinn) is avoided by an 
insistence on judgment. Equally both Plato and Ficino 
recognized that once imitation is distanced then 
there is a problem of  nonsense. The important point 
is that while creativity did not demand the following 
of  rules judgment was the techné that emerged in 
relation to what had been created in this way. It was 
a conception of  judgement that was not determined 
by a reciprocity or correspondence on the level of  
techné. This is the setting of  the hermeneutic.
Finally, therefore, if  the rhapsode carries from 
the poet to the audience, then what is carried is the 
indeterminate relation between thought and words. 
The rhapsode is engaging (carrying) continually 
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with that which is already there to-be-determined. 
Perhaps it is possible to go further and suggest 
that the rhapsode tarries with the to-be-determined. 
The rhapsode remains the reader. Moreover, in 
reciting works, in every performance, the rhapsode 
is continually providing readings. 
Reading now as that which will have always been 
attended in advance by the ineliminability of  the 
need for and thus the practice of  judgment. These 
readings inspire. Equally they call for judgement. 
Readings demand readings. 
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